ABSTRACTS

Dissertations and Theses on Islam and Muslims

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Since its reintroduction in 1900, Christianity has become one of the central defining political factors in the history of modern Sudan. In response to the push by Northern political elites for the Arabization and Islamization of Southern Sudan, large numbers of Southerners embraced Christianity as a rallying point in their defense. After initially rejecting Christianity as foreign, Western import and an instrument for colonial domination, the Southern communities realized that Christianity connected them to a world larger than their traditional ethnic communities and added strength in their struggle for political freedom, economic justice, and cultural survival.

The Anglican (CMS), American United Presbyterian (APM) and Catholic (RC) missions were begun in 1900 and were conditioned by the colonial reality. Fearing an uprising by the Muslims, the British rulers prohibited proselytism in the North and sent the missionaries to evangelize among the “Southern pagans.” In the South, the progress of evangelism was shaped by Sudanese nationalism. Between 1901 and 1932, the Southerners resisted all foreigners, missionaries included. Negative missionary attitudes toward the Southern religions and cultures also hurt evangelism.

In the 1930s, the Southerners changed their political strategy and accepted Western education as a tool for liberation. Many Southern youths enrolled in mission schools, became committed Christians, evangelists, religious and civil leaders. Despite missionary opposition in the 1940s, the Southern converts also began to reconcile the Gospel with their traditional beliefs and cultural practices. Consequently, large numbers of Southerners embraced Christianity.

In the 1940s, the Northern nationalists moved to end the Anglo-Egyptian colonial rule, annex the South to the North, and Islamize and Arabize the Southerners, establishing an Arab Islamic state in the Sudan. To achieve their goal, Christianity and the Southern cultural and religious heritage had to be eliminated. In defiance thousands of Southerners turned to Christianity and organized themselves politically to demand freedom, justice and respect for their religion and culture. Failing to dominate the South politically, the Northern rulers turned to military repression. Between 1958 and 1964, the Southern Christians faced open persecution. Far from being broken by the brutal repression, the Southern Christians were strengthened in their faith.


_Sira maghāzi_, which tells of the life of the Prophet and the early Islamic community, is not a historical genre. A literary mode which has its origins in an oral transmission, it is essentially hagiographic in spirit. The literature carries some unique characteristics. Constituted of numerous individual traditions juxtaposed one next to the other, it is—other than for those key events that have become mythologized—essentially dependent on the compiler and his purpose for its layout.

This dissertation explores the genre through a comparative case study of Muhammad and the Jews as narrated in the _Kitab sirat rasul Allah_ of Ibn Ishâq and the _Kitab al mag-
hazī of al Waqidi. Appreciating the interpretation of the individual compiler concerned, it compares, in terms of method, structure, sources, chronology, and style, their different approaches to the subject of the early establishment of Islam. The differences reinforce the argument for appreciating sīra maghāzī as literary rather than a historical genre. More importantly, they bring into focus the tendentious nature of sīra maghāzī to understand why neither one of these texts may be used to substantiate the information in the other.


Well before the Occultation of the Twelfth imam in 330/942 and before the time of the great Shi’i theologians such as al Shaykh al Mufid (d. 413/1022), the Shi’ah had constructed their own integral and elaborate system of thought. This thought is expressed in the sayings of the Shi‘i imams, recorded in hadith collections gathered in the traditionist centers of Kufah and Qum. It is apparent when these narratives are pieced together that the Shi‘i system as presented by the Shi‘ah themselves bears little resemblance to the descriptions of the heresiographers. At the center of the Shi‘i worldview is the relation between the imams and the community. The imams’ constitution is altogether supernatural, and they succeed to the whole of the prophetic knowledge, while the Shi‘ah, who were created of the same substance as the imams, are the bearers and beneficiaries of that knowledge. The imams continue to receive intelligence from God so that they know everything and are able to address themselves to every circumstance, while the Shi‘ah must resort to no one else to guide them. God is known only through the imams and they conduct their followers to Paradise while others are left for the Fire. There is, however, evidence of revision of belief already in the time of the first traditionists. The definition of faith is emended so as to allow the non-Shi‘ah a place in Paradise and enable the Shi‘ah to integrate into the larger community. The confinement of the imams by the Abbasids and the lesser Occultation lead to reconsideration of the question of authority: human reason is given a greater role as the Shi‘ah set about thinking how to evaluate the words of the imams already recorded. Kalam, a field of enquiry formerly forbidden to the faithful Shi‘ah due to the necessity of absolute submission to the statements of the imams, is sanctioned so that dicta concerning theology are issued under their names. Tradition now moves away from predestinarianism, and other features of post-Occultation Shiism are prefigured. Early Shi‘i tradition presents the record of a community moving from exclusivism and rigid traditionalism toward greater social and intellectual integration.


A contrast is often presumed to exist between Christian and Islamic understandings of just war, particularly regarding holy war. This project employs philosophic method to examine the medieval formulations of just war criteria—offered by Augustine for the Christian tradition and Alfarabi for the Islamic—and asks of each: is it the case that they necessarily generate contrasts on just war? Appropriate criteria to investigate are determined by a survey of just war thinking following the Persian Gulf War. Commentaries by Johnson, Elshtain, Walzer, Weigel, and Nusseibeh are among those considered.

Findings indicate less contrast than agreement between Augustine and Alfarabi. Both employ divine revelation, with reason as authenticating agent. The two philosophers limit just war to response to injustice so egregious that the universal conscience is compelled to act forcibly. Jihad, according to Alfarabi, is this kind of war and can only be waged by the universal community. Augustine is equally prohibiting in theory but more permissive in practical terms. The difference is primarily derived from concepts of right authority. For Alfarabi, right authority is rational, expressed via any philosophically valid religion. Augustine’s authority need not be rational and is specifically Christian. This comparative
relationship runs throughout, rendering Augustine’s just war criteria loosely defined, with easy compliance for the reluctantly just state. Alfarabi’s criteria are more explicit, requiring domestic justice to qualify as a wager of just war.

Augustine and Alfarabi present options for just war that are consistent with their traditions but different in content from common interpretations. This interpretive range allows them to illuminate currently problematic issues. Interdependence is addressed by Augustine and Alfarabi through an expanded definition of “self-defense” that posits the “self” as the universal community. Both also speak to pressures to legitimize intervention to establish domestic conditions of a just peace. Augustine and Alfarabi counsel extreme caution on this point and Alfarabi, in particular, suggests a preventative strategy of developing more virtuous citizens.


This thesis is a study of how and why citizens become active in opposition movements under conditions of authoritarian rule. In particular, it aims to explain why some lower-middle class graduates have become politically active in Mubarak’s Egypt, and why their activism has assumed an Islamic form.

Rather than move directly from social structures and the discontents they generate to instances of collective action, the thesis argues that oppositional activism is an outcome of political mobilization. It hence focuses on the conditions which determine whether, and how, linkages develop between opposition movements and potential recruits.

The thesis identifies changes in Egypt’s political economy in the 1970s and early 1980s which lead to the fragmentation of Egypt’s “new middle class” and the emergence of a young, educated underclass at its base. It explains why, despite high levels of grievance, most graduates have remained politically quiescent and how, despite authoritarian constraints, the Islamists have managed to mobilize some graduates into politics.

Drawing on both the “resource mobilization” and “collective identity” strands of the social movement literature, the thesis highlights the causal role of institutions and ideas in the construction of political actors. It argues that the partial liberalization of the Egyptian polity from above, combined with an erosion in state capacities for surveillance and control, expanded the “structures of political opportunity” for Islamist outreach on the periphery of the formal political order. Through the dissemination of Islamist ideology and the establishment of communal networks, the Islamists have created new motivations and venues for graduate political involvement. Further, Islamic mobilization on the periphery has impacted the politics of the center by creating a support base for Islamist candidates in professional association and parliamentary elections.

By explaining how the Islamic movement in Egypt managed to forge the very kinds of elite-mass linkage that existing authoritarian controls were designed to prevent, the thesis seeks to contribute to the broader literature on social movements in authoritarian settings.


Sayyid Jamal al Din al Husayni, known to the world as “al Afghani,” was a prominent figure in the Islamic world’s struggle to cope with political and cultural challenges emanating from European states during the nineteenth century. Although he died in the 1890’s, his stature among political movements calling themselves “Islamist” has steadily increased in this century. While there have always been some doubts about his true origins, his self-advanced claims of an Afghan birth and upbringing within the Sunni Islamic tradition have been widely accepted. Beginning in the late 1960’s, however, several historians attempted to prove that he was, in fact, an Iranian by birth and a Shi‘i
Muslim by upbringing. This “revisionist biography” has been widely accepted in Western academia, but remains controversial and unpopular in much of the Islamic world.

Jamal al Din’s revisionist biographers utilized physical evidence and the testimony of eyewitnesses in their attempts to show that he was of Persian provenance. In this thesis a different approach is taken in an effort to clarify this issue. The revisionist biography is carefully analyzed, showing how it is possible for students of Jamal al Din to persist in their adherence to the traditional version of his life. Following this, Jamal al Din’s own writings are examined in order show how his political ideas are based on unmistakably Shi'i concepts.

It is asserted here that Jamal al Din’s most important contribution to the Islamic modernist movement was his ability to take explicitly Shi'i ideas on *ijtihad*, *taqlid*, *jihad*, and other political notions current in Islamdom and introduce them in an acceptable form into mainstream Sunni political discourse. The manner in which he did so is explored in the final chapter. The relevance of this transmission of Shi'i ideas into Sunni political debates is also taken up at the end of the text, and its possible implications for the future of Islamic politics is considered.


This is a study of the Aleppan civilian elite during the Ayyûbid period (579–658/1183–1260), as portrayed by Ibn al-'Adîm in the biographical dictionary and history of Aleppo, *Bughyat al talab fi ta’rikh Halab*. My general goals in this dissertation are to discover who were the Aleppan civilian elite, what was the basis for their high social status and power, and how these attributes affected the course of Aleppo and Syrian history.

Ibn al 'Adîm’s education, high social status, and government career influenced his views on notability. His life and career illustrate the ways men rose to prominence in Aleppo, the various ties that many elite members cultivated during the course of their study that supported them throughout their public careers, and the nature of some of these public careers.

An analysis of sixty-two biographical notices of notables, who were contemporaries of Ibn al ‘Adîm, uncovers two different images of the civilian elite, one factual and the other ideal. The first reveals the concrete circumstances of these notables in contemporary society, in terms of the occupations they held and degree of professional mobility they experienced. The second image reflects Ibn al ‘Adîm’s concept of the perfect notable. This shows the social cultural values of Ibn al ‘Adîm’s time and place which guided his definition of notability.

Land and property ownership during the Ayyûbid period was an important indicator for notable status and social power. To secure their holdings and social standing in society, the civilian elite continued to make use of all forms of property control available to them, namely *milk* (ownership, *iqtâ‘*) (assignment of a stipend from the revenue of a specific property), and *waqf* (endowment).

The political role that the notables played throughout the history of Aleppo is seen by Ibn al ‘Adîm to have influenced the course of the principality’s history. The increased erosion of these notables’ political influence during Ayyûbid rule marks a transformation of the role that they played in medieval Aleppo. This transformation, however, represents an intermediate stage in their gradual evolution from a politically relevant social group in the pre-Nûrîd period to an inactive group, whose political functions were taken over by the military in the Mamlûk period.

A microsociological examination of the problem of Swahili identity, this study compares two rural communities on the island of Pemba, Zanzibar, Tanzania. I argue that Swahili identity in rural Pemba has been shaped by the nature of indigenes' relations with the descendants of Omani settlers who arrived in the last century. Where Arabs settled (the clove region of the island), they have achieved ideological hegemony with the result that Swahili define themselves negatively and try to emulate Arabs when they can. In contrast, where Omanis did not settle (the rocky "coral rag") being Swahili is more positively defined.

Background chapters introduce the problem of Swahili identity and outline the ways observers have defined "the Swahili." I consider what the label "Swahili" means to those who have been so classified and discuss the use of other labels, such as "Shirazi.

Subsequent chapters, based on fourteen months' field work in Pemba, discuss descent group organization, land tenure, and methods of interpreting and managing misfortune. While inhabitants of Furaha actively reproduce "customary" practices which they see as setting them apart from Omanis, residents of Mzambaruni have undergone substantial economic and social changes as a result of long-term involvement with cloves and Arabs. Although the economic gulf between Arabs and Swahili has narrowed, there are still more wealthy Arabs than poor ones. Yet it is only partly on this basis that they continue to hold a position of ideological hegemony in Mzambaruni.

A chapter on methods of interpreting and managing misfortune describes ideas about spirits, witchcraft, sorcery, and curing. I discuss why Swahili reproduce practices which Arabs see as further proof of their moral and ritual inferiority and relate this to wider issues concerning Islam.

In conclusion, I suggest that being "Swahili" is the result of complex dialectical processes of self-definition and definition by others. Though there have been serious challenges to the notion of hegemony, the relation between Omanis and Swahili in the clove areas of Pemba is indeed hegemonic. Finally, I consider the role of the state in defining relations between ethnic groups and economic classes in Pemba.


The main objective of this dissertation is to evaluate and discuss the origins and the nature of development of early cities in eastern Africa, particularly Somalia. There are hundreds of towns that dot along the eastern African coast from the northern coast of Somalia to Mozambique. Early scholars have assumed that the coastal cities were far too sophisticated architecturally to be the work of indigenous African people. Most students of eastern African coastal archaeology have been convinced, at least implicitly, that these cities were founded by Muslim colonialists and that their location at the rim of the continent made them part of the Islamic civilization across the ocean. In fact, cities had developed in the region by the beginning of the Christian era and their development was an indigenous phenomenon with African credentials.

I use several kinds of evidence to support the indigenous development of these cities, including historical records, recent archaeological research, oral traditions, and environmental data.

It is hoped that this thesis will provide basis for future archaeological research in Somalia and will provide useful guidelines in interpreting data related to the development of urbanism in the region.